Believing in semantics

Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (1):101--144 (1978)
This paper concerns the semantics of belief-sentences. I pass over ontologically lavish theories which appeal to impossible worlds, or other points of reference which contain more than possible worlds. I then refute ontologically stingy, quotational theories. My own theory employs the techniques of possible worlds semantics to elaborate a Fregean analysis of belief-sentences. In a belief-sentence, the embedded clause does not have its usual reference, but refers rather to its own semantic structure. I show how this theory can accommodate quantification into belief-contexts. I close with skirmishes against the threat posed by the Liar Paradox.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00365131
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References found in this work BETA
Richard Montague (1975). Formal Philosophy. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):573-578.

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Citations of this work BETA
John Bigelow (1981). Semantic Nominalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (4):403 – 421.
M. J. Cresswell (1983). Bigelow's Semantic Nominalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (1):78 – 80.

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