Graduate studies at Western
Erkenntnis 76 (1):1-22 (2012)
|Abstract||David Lewis’s latest theory of causation defines the causal link in terms of the relation of influence between events. It turns out, however, that one event’s influencing another is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for its being a cause of that event. In the article one particular case of causality without influence is presented and developed. This case not only serves as a counterexample to Lewis’s influence theory, but also threatens earlier counterfactual analyses of causation by admitting a particularly troublesome type of preemption. The conclusion of the article is that Lewis’s influence method of solving the preemption problem fails, and that we need a new and fresh approach to the cases of redundant causation if we want to hold on to the counterfactual analysis of causation|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
I. Kvart (2001). Lewis's 'Causation as Influence'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):409 – 421.
Jonathan Schaffer (2001). Causation, Influence, and Effluence. Analysis 61 (1):11–19.
Sungho Choi (2005). Understanding the Influence Theory of Causation: A Critique of Strevens. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 63 (1):101 - 118.
Jim Stone (2009). Trumping the Causal Influence Account of Causation. Philosophical Studies 142 (2):153 - 160.
Cei Maslen (2004). Degrees of Influence and the Problem of Pre-Emption. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (4):577 – 594.
Murali Ramachandran (1997). A Counterfactual Analysis of Causation. Mind 106 (422):263-277.
Peter Menzies, Counterfactual Theories of Causation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Christopher Hitchcock (forthcoming). What is the 'Cause' in Causal Decision Theory? Erkenntnis:1-18.
Douglas Kutach (2011). Backtracking Influence. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (1):55-71.
Peter Menzies (1989). Probabilistic Causation and Causal Processes: A Critique of Lewis. Philosophy of Science 56 (4):642-663.
Richard Otte (1987). Indeterminism, Counterfactuals, and Causation. Philosophy of Science 54 (1):45-62.
Peter Menzies (2004). Difference-Making in Context. In J. Collins, N. Hall & L. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. Mit Press.
Joseph A. Baltimore (2011). Lewis' Modal Realism and Absence Causation. Metaphysica 12 (2):117-124.
Ernest Sosa (ed.) (1975). Causation and Conditionals. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2011-10-19
Total downloads42 ( #31,924 of 749,219 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #62,995 of 749,219 )
How can I increase my downloads?