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- John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter (2006). Real Work for Aggregates. Dialectica 60 (4):485–503.
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Introduction: Thinking, writing, and reading about the real -- Dialectic and the real : Lacan, Hegel, and the alchemy of après-coup -- 'Reality' and the real : culture as anamorphosis -- The real of sexual difference : imagining, thinking, being -- Ethics and the real : the ungodly virtues of psychoanalysis -- Politics, or, the art of the impossible.
A Fuzzy-Set Theoretical Framework -resting on a paraconsistent infinite-valued logic- is sketched, wherein a thorough ontological-reduction program can be carried out. The framework includes formulae of the form “x comprises z in the time-interval e”. Reducing aggregates to sets thus handled is shown to escape usual objections. Likewise, systems generally can be regarded as aggregates, hence as (fuzzy) sets -the purported nonextensionality of systems objection being disposed of owing to our system’s recognizing infinitely many membership degrees. So do bodies, too, which enables us to find a solutionto Unger’s sorites concerning ordinary material bodies.
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Before one can construct scales of minimal complexity in the Real Core Model, K(R), one needs to develop the fine-structure theory of K(R). In this paper, the fine structure theory of mice, first introduced by Dodd and Jensen, is generalized to that of real mice. A relative criterion for mouse iterability is presented together with two theorems concerning the definability of this criterion. The proof of the first theorem requires only fine structure; whereas, the second theorem applies to real mice satisfying AD and follows from a general definability result obtained by abstracting work of John Steel on L(R). In conclusion, we discuss several consequences of the work presented in this paper relevant to two issues: the complexity of scales in K(R) and the strength of the theory ZF + AD + ¬ DC R.
According to the dominant "nexus of contracts" and "collection of assets" views of the firm, the firm is a either a fiction or an aggregate. Although legal personality is important in both accounts, everything is said to be achieved by private contract alone and the law's role in creating legal entity status is dismissed. The paper challenges both these aspects by reconsidering an alternative "real entity theory" that dominated debates at the turn of the twentieth century. This forgotten view holds that the firm is neither a fiction nor an aggregate but a real entity, and underlines the creation of legal entity status as a fundamental role of the law. The paper discusses this view's ontological and legal insights, clarifies the proposition that the firm is a real entity, and proposes it as a starting point for a theory of the firm.
Peter French has argued that conglomerate collectivities such as business corporations are moral persons and that aggregate collectivities such as lynch mobs are not. Two arguments are advanced to show that French's claim is flawed. First, the distinction between aggregates and conglomerates is, at best, a distinction of degree, not kind. Moreover, some aggregates show evidence of moral personhood. Second, French's criterion for distinguishing aggregates and conglomerates is based on inadequate grounds. Application of the criterion to specific cases requires an additional judgment of a pragmatic nature which undermines any attempt to demonstrate French's thesis that actual conglomerates are moral persons and aggregates are not. Thus, French's theory is seriously lacking both empirical basis and empirical relevance.
Here it is argued, with the help of Tsongkhapa's interpretation of Candrakīrti's theory of persons, and on the basis of the character of Vasubandhu's encounter with the Pudgalavādins in the "Refutation of the Theory of Self," that in his Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya . Candrakīrti most likely identifies the theory of persons he attributes to the Sāṃmitīyas with the theory of persons Vasubandhu presents in the "Refutation," and the theory of persons he attributes to the Āryasāṃmitīyas with the Pudgalavādins' theory of persons, to which Vasubandhu objects in that same work. He interprets Vasubandhu's thesis, that persons exist as their aggregates, as the thesis of the Sāṃmitīyas, that persons possess the essence of the aggregates, and interprets the Pudgalavādins' thesis, that persons exist apart from their aggregates as their identity-free substratum, as the thesis of the Āryasāṃmitīyas, that persons possess an essence of something that is neither other than nor the same as the aggregates. It is explained that Candrakīrti's interpretations both rest on the assumption that existence is the possession of an essence and mirror the assumptions upon which Vasubandhu and the Pudgalavādins object to one another's thesis.
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