American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1):39-49 (1990)
|Abstract||The authors argue, against Frank Jackson, that weakness (and strength) of will involves higher-order mental states. The authors hold that this is compatible with a decision-theoretic belief-desire psychology of human action.|
|Keywords||weakness of will strength of will decision theory|
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