Temptation and the Will

American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1):39-49 (1990)
The authors argue, against Frank Jackson, that weakness (and strength) of will involves higher-order mental states. The authors hold that this is compatible with a decision-theoretic belief-desire psychology of human action.
Keywords weakness of will  strength of will  decision theory
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DOI 10.2307/20014310
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Alfred Mele (2010). Weakness of Will and Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 150 (3):391–404.
Xavier Vanmechelen (1998). Does Rationality Presuppose Irrationality. Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):126 – 139.

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