The big bad bug: What are the humean's chances?
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (3):443-462 (1993)
| Abstract | Humean supervenience is the doctrine that there are no necessary connections in the world. David Lewis identifies one big bad bug to the programme of providing Humean analyses for apparently non-Humean features of the world. The bug is chance. We put the bug under the microscope, and conclude that chance is no special problem for the Humean. | |||||||||
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Barry Ward (2003). Sometimes the World is Not Enough: The Pursuit of Explanatory Laws in a Humean World. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2):175–197.
Barry Loewer (2004). David Lewis's Humean Theory of Objective Chance. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1115--25.
Carl Hoefer (2007). The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Sceptic's Guide to Objective Chance. Mind 116 (463):549-596.
Jenann Ismael (2008). Raid! Dissolving the Big, Bad Bug. Noûs 42 (2):292–307.
Frank Arntzenius & Ned Hall (2003). On What We Know About Chance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):171-179.
Rachael Briggs (2009). The Anatomy of the Big Bad Bug. Noûs 43 (3):428-449.
Carl Hoefer (2007). The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Sceptic's Guide to Objective Chance. Mind 116 (463):549 - 596.
Rachael Briggs (2009). The Big Bad Bug Bites Anti-Realists About Chance. Synthese 167 (1):81--92.
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