Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):29-42 (2007)
|Abstract||This paper specifies two hypotheses that are intimated in recent research on empathy and mindreading. The first, the phenomenal simulation hypothesis, holds that those attributing mental states (i.e., mindreaders) sometimes simulate the phenomenal states of those to whom they are making attributions (i.e., targets). The second, the phenomenal mindreading hypothesis, holds that this phenomenal simulation plays an important role in some mental state attributions. After explicating these hypotheses, the paper focuses on the first. It argues that neuropsychological experiments on empathy and behavioral experiments on imitation provide good reason to think that mindreaders sometimes simulate targets' phenomenal states. Accordingly, the paper concludes, the phenomenal mindreading hypothesis merits consideration|
|Keywords||EMOTIONAL FACIAL EXPRESSIONS NEURAL SYSTEMS BRAIN ACTIVITY EMPATHY PAIN RECOGNITION IMITATION COHERENCE EXPERIENCE PHYSIOLOGY|
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