The phenomenal mindreader: A case for phenomenal simulation

Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):29-42 (2007)
Abstract
This paper specifies two hypotheses that are intimated in recent research on empathy and mindreading. The first, the phenomenal simulation hypothesis, holds that those attributing mental states (i.e., mindreaders) sometimes simulate the phenomenal states of those to whom they are making attributions (i.e., targets). The second, the phenomenal mindreading hypothesis, holds that this phenomenal simulation plays an important role in some mental state attributions. After explicating these hypotheses, the paper focuses on the first. It argues that neuropsychological experiments on empathy and behavioral experiments on imitation provide good reason to think that mindreaders sometimes simulate targets' phenomenal states. Accordingly, the paper concludes, the phenomenal mindreading hypothesis merits consideration
Keywords EMOTIONAL FACIAL EXPRESSIONS   NEURAL SYSTEMS   BRAIN ACTIVITY   EMPATHY   PAIN   RECOGNITION   IMITATION   COHERENCE   EXPERIENCE   PHYSIOLOGY
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References found in this work BETA
A. Goldman (1993). The Psychology of Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.

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Citations of this work BETA
Stephen Biggs (2009). Phenomenal Concepts in Mindreading. Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):647 – 667.
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