The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist's Philosophy of Mathematics

Oxford University Press (1988)
Abstract
Challenging the myth that mathematical objects can be defined into existence, Bigelow here employs Armstrong's metaphysical materialism to cast new light on mathematics. He identifies natural, real, and imaginary numbers and sets with specified physical properties and relations and, by so doing, draws mathematics back from its sterile, abstract exile into the midst of the physical world.
Keywords Mathematics Philosophy  Set theory  Logic, Symbolic and mathematical
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Call number QA8.4.B53 1988
ISBN(s) 0198249578   9780198249573  
DOI 10.2307/2220120
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Ben Caplan & David Sanson (2010). The Way Things Were. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):24-39.
Ross P. Cameron (2007). The Contingency of Composition. Philosophical Studies 136 (1):99-121.

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