The Truth in Antirealism
| Abstract | Throughout his career, Barry Taylor argued for several key theses in semantics and in epistemology. He calls these theses “Antirealism”. I will suggest, however, that a “Realist” could, and perhaps should, accept these semantic and epistemic theses. Doing so would not, I argue, conflict with the core this of philosophical Realism, properly so-called, since this thesis is not semantic or epistemological, but “ontological”. A Realist about (say) badgers is just someone who believes that there are badgers. And Taylor’s semantic and epistemological theses are not intended to entail any denial that there are (say) badgers. However, Taylor argues that the core theses of “realism” cannot be any such merely ontological theses. I will defend a simplistic, “ontological” understanding of “realism” against Taylor’s arguments. Taylor also usefully identifies something that others have called “Common-sense Realism”. But this so-called “Realism”, Taylor argues, is not properly described as any kind of “realism” at all – because it does not affirm Taylor’s key theses in semantics and epistemology. Yet I say it is realism – provided only that it does not also take a perverse stand on a realist’s “Euthyphro” question: Do (say) badgers exist because our ways of talking and knowing would ideally converge on an affirmation of the sentence “Badgers exist”? Isn’t it, rather, the case that, insofar as our ways of talking and knowing would ideally converge on an affirmation of the sentence “Badgers exist”, this is so at least in part because badgers exist? | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,631 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Only published papers are available at libraries |
Similar books and articlesStephen Leeds (2007). Correspondence Truth and Scientific Realism. Synthese 159 (1):1 - 21.
WR Stirton (1997). Anti-Realism, Truth-Conditions and Verificationism. Mind 106 (424):697-716.
Larry Laudan (1981). A Confutation of Convergent Realism. Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
Robert T. Lehe (1998). Realism and Reality. Journal of Philosophical Research 23:219-237.
David Leech Anderson (2007). Consciousness and Realism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):1-17.
Luca Moretti (2007). A Thick Realist Consequence of Wright's Minimalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):24–38.
Susan Haack (1987). Realism. Synthese 73 (2):275 - 299.
Janet Folina (1995). Putnam, Realism and Truth. Synthese 103 (2):141--52.
Barry Taylor (2006). Models, Truth, and Realism. Oxford University Press.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2010-08-16Total downloads81 ( #9,439 of 548,972 )Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,799 of 548,972 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
