Bending it like beckham: Movement, control and deviant causal chains

Analysis 70 (2):299-303 (2010)
Like all causal theories in philosophy, the causal theory of action is plagued by the problem of deviant causal chains. I have proposed a solution on the basis of the assumption that mental states and events are causally efficacious in virtue of their contents. This solution has been questioned by Torbjörn Tännsjö (2009). First, I will reply to the objection, and then I will discuss Tännsjö’s alternative.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anp176
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PhilPapers Archive Markus E. Schlosser, Bending it like beckham: Movement, control and deviant causal chains
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Andrei A. Buckareff (2011). Intralevel Mental Causation. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):402-425.

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