David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialogue 32 (03):507-525 (1993)
This paper addresses two objections raised against anomalous monism. Firstly, on the basis of Davidson's assertion that all causal relations fall under strict laws, many critics conclude mental properties are causally inert since they are non-nomic. I argue that this conclusion follows only on the further assumption that all causally efficacious properties are nomic properties. It is perfectly consistent, however, to hold that there is a law covering each causal relation without each causal statement being the instantiation of a law. Secondly, I countervail Kim's claim that the only option open to physicalists is reductionism by showing how weak supervenience preserves both the dependence of the mental on the physical and the irreducibility of mental explanations to physical ones.
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References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (1985). A New Basis for Decision Theory. Theory and Decision 18 (1):87-98.
Donald Davidson (1963). Actions, Reasons, and Causes. Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685-700.
Donald Davidson (1967). Causal Relations. Journal of Philosophy 64 (21):691-703.
Donald Davidson (1991). Epistemology Externalized. Dialectica 45 (2‐3):191-202.
Donald Davidson (1987). Knowing One's Own Mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
Citations of this work BETA
Neil Campbell (2002). Physicalism, Supervenience, and Dependence: A Reply to Botterell. Dialogue 41 (1):163-167.
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