David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):386-401 (1996)
The ‘hard problem’ of the origin of phenomenal consciousness in a physical universe is aggravated by a simplistic and uncritical concept of the physical realm which still predominates in much discussion of the subject. David Chalmers is correct in claiming that phenomenal experience is logically independent of a physical description of the world, but his proposal for a ‘natural supervenience’ of experience on a physical substrate is misguided. His statements about machine consciousness and the role of information are especially compromised. A careful analysis of physical concepts indicates that the hard problem as originally proposed is insoluble but also fortunately based on misconceptions. Modern physics suggests a more sophisticated and richer ontology which will be essential for a deeper understanding of our rapidly growing knowledge of psychology and neuroscience
|Keywords||Consciousness Machine Mind Physics Psychology Science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
H. Barnum (2003). Quantum Information Processing, Operational Quantum Logic, Convexity, and the Foundations of Physics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 34 (3):343-379.
Similar books and articles
Nicholas Boltuc & Peter Boltuc (2007). Replication of the Hard Problem of Consciousness in AI and Bio-AI: An Early Conceptual Framework. In Anthony Chella & Ricardo Manzotti (eds.), AI and Consciousness: Theoretical Foundations and Current Approaches. AAAI Press, Merlo Park, CA
Amit Goswami (1990). Consciousness in Quantum Physics and the Mind-Body Problem. Journal of Mind and Behavior 11 (1):75-96.
Stevan Harnad (2003). Can a Machine Be Conscious? How? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4):67-75.
Kieron O'Hara & Tom Scutt (1996). There is No Hard Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):290-302.
Robert Rosen (1993). Drawing the Boundary Between Subject and Object: Comments on the Mind-Brain Problem. Theoretical Medicine 14 (2):89-100.
David J. Chalmers (1997). Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (1):3-46.
Michael Tye (2009). Interview for Mind and Consciousness: 5 Questions. In Patrick Grim (ed.), Mind and Consciousness: 5 Questions. Automatic Press
Blake H. Dournaee (2010). Comments on “The Replication of the Hard Problem of Consciousness in AI and Bio-AI”. Minds and Machines 20 (2):303-309.
Piotr Boltuc (2009). The Philosophical Issue in Machine Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (01):155-176.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads55 ( #60,589 of 1,724,892 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #167,179 of 1,724,892 )
How can I increase my downloads?