David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Topoi 27 (1-2):17-27 (2008)
Do conventions need to be common knowledge in order to work? David Lewis builds this requirement into his definition of a convention. This paper explores the extent to which his approach finds support in the game theory literature. The knowledge formalism developed by Robert Aumann and others militates against Lewis’s approach, because it shows that it is almost impossible for something to become common knowledge in a large society. On the other hand, Ariel Rubinstein’s Email Game suggests that coordinated action is no less hard for rational players without a common knowledge requirement. But an unnecessary simplifying assumption in the Email Game turns out to be doing all the work, and the current paper concludes that common knowledge is better excluded from a definition of the conventions that we use to regulate our daily lives
|Keywords||Conventions Common knowledge Game theory|
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1969). Convention: A Philosophical Study. Harvard University Press.
Brian Skyrms (1996). Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge University Press.
K. G. Binmore (2005). Natural Justice. Oxford University Press.
Ken Binmore (2007). Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory. Oxford University Press Usa.
Ken Binmore (1987). Modeling Rational Players: Part I. Economics and Philosophy 3 (2):179.
Citations of this work BETA
Cyril Hédoin (2014). A Framework for Community-Based Salience: Common Knowledge, Common Understanding and Community Membership. Economics and Philosophy 30 (3):365-395.
Ken Binmore (2011). Interpreting Knowledge in the Backward Induction Problem. Episteme 8 (3):248-261.
Rouslan Koumakhov (2014). Conventionalism, Coordination, and Mental Models: From Poincaré to Simon. Journal of Economic Methodology 21 (3):251-272.
Jelle de Boer (2012). A Strawson–Lewis Defence of Social Preferences. Economics and Philosophy 28 (3):291-310.
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