David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Topoi 27 (1-2):17-27 (2008)
Do conventions need to be common knowledge in order to work? David Lewis builds this requirement into his definition of a convention. This paper explores the extent to which his approach finds support in the game theory literature. The knowledge formalism developed by Robert Aumann and others militates against Lewis’s approach, because it shows that it is almost impossible for something to become common knowledge in a large society. On the other hand, Ariel Rubinstein’s Email Game suggests that coordinated action is no less hard for rational players without a common knowledge requirement. But an unnecessary simplifying assumption in the Email Game turns out to be doing all the work, and the current paper concludes that common knowledge is better excluded from a definition of the conventions that we use to regulate our daily lives
|Keywords||Conventions Common knowledge Game theory|
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Citations of this work BETA
Ken Binmore (2011). Interpreting Knowledge in the Backward Induction Problem. Episteme 8 (3):248-261.
Richard Moore (2013). Imitation and Conventional Communication. Biology and Philosophy 28 (3):481-500.
Jelle de Boer (2013). A Stag Hunt with Signalling and Mutual Beliefs. Biology and Philosophy 28 (4):559-576.
Giovanna Devetag, Hykel Hosni & Giacomo Sillari (2013). You Better Play 7: Mutual Versus Common Knowledge of Advice in a Weak-Link Experiment. Synthese 190 (8):1351-1381.
Joseph Bulbulia (2012). Spreading Order: Religion, Cooperative Niche Construction, and Risky Coordination Problems. Biology and Philosophy 27 (1):1-27.
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