Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||This paper argues that we need to look beyond Bayesian decision theory for an answer to the general problem of making rational decisions under uncertainty. The view that Bayesian decision theory is only genuinely valid in a small world was asserted very ﬁrmly by Leonard Savage  when laying down the principles of the theory in his path-breaking Foundations of Statistics. He makes the distinction between small and large worlds in a folksy way by quoting the proverbs ”Look before you leap” and ”Cross that bridge when you come to it”. You are in a small world if it is feasible always to look before you leap. You are in a large world if there are some bridges that you cannot cross before you come to them. As Savage comments, when proverbs conﬂict, it is proverbially true that there is some truth in both—that they apply in diﬀerent contexts. He then argues that some decision situations are best modeled in terms of a small world, but others are not. He explicitly rejects the idea that all worlds can be treated as small as both ”ridiculous” and ”preposterous”. The ﬁrst half of his book is then devoted to a very successful development of the set of ideas now known as Bayesian decision theory for use in small worlds. The second half of the book is an attempt to develop a quite diﬀerent set of ideas for use in large worlds, but this part of the book is usually said to be a failure by those who are aware of its existence.2 Frank Knight  draws a similar distinction between making decision under risk or uncertainty.3 The pioneering work of Gilboa and Schmeidler  on making..|
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