A point of view on points of view

Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):3-12 (2006)
A number of writers have deployed the notion of a point of view as a key to the allegedly theory-resistant subjective aspect of experience. I examine that notion more closely than is usually done and find that it cannot support the anti-objectivist's case. Experience may indeed have an irreducibly subjective aspect, but the notion of a point of view cannot be used to show that it does.
Keywords consciousness experience objectivity point of view subjectivity bat qualia
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DOI 10.1080/09515080500471835
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Nagel (1974). What is It Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
David Lewis (1979). Attitudes de Dicto and de Se. Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.

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