Justified judging

When is a belief or judgment justified? One might be forgiven for thinking the search for single answer to this question to be hopeless. The concept of justification is required to fulfil several tasks: to evaluate beliefs epistemically, to fill in the gap between truth and knowledge, to describe the virtuous organization of one’s beliefs, to describe the relationship between evidence and theory (and thus relate to confirmation and probabilification). While some of these may be held to overlap, the prospects for fulfilling all may well seem poor. Furthermore the internalist requires that justification be an introspectible property of beliefs and a fundamental epistemic concept, while the externalist is often happy to ignore the concept altogether or at best regard it as an embarrassing add-on to their epistemology. In the light of this one might reasonably give up on justification altogether or adopt pluralist approach, denying that justification is any single property of beliefs of judgments.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00004.x
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Conor McHugh (2012). Belief and Aims. Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.
Conor McHugh (2013). The Illusion of Exclusivity. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):n/a-n/a.
Lisa Miracchi (2015). Competence to Know. Philosophical Studies 172 (1):29-56.

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