Justified judging

Traditional approaches to epistemology have sought, unsuccessfully, to define knowledge in terms of justification. I follow Timothy Williamson in arguing that this is misconceived and that we should take knowledge as our fundamental epistemological notion. We can then characterise justification as a certain sort of approximation to knowledge. A judgement is justified if and only if the reason (if there is one) for a failure to know is to be found outside the subject's mental states; that is, justified judging is possible knowing (where one world accessible from another if and only if they are identical with regard to a subject's antecedent mental states and judgement forming processes). This view is explained and defended.
Keywords justification, belief, judgment
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00004.x
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Citations of this work BETA
Clayton Littlejohn (2010). Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.
Charles Côté-Bouchard (2015). Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):337-355.
Alexander Bird (2008). Scientific Progress as Accumulation of Knowledge: A Reply to Rowbottom. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):279-281.

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