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- Alexander Bird (2009). Kripke. In Christopher Belshaw & Gary Kemp (eds.), Twelve Modern Philosophers. Wiley--Blackwell.
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George Wilson has recently defended Kripke's well-known interpretation of Wittgenstein against the criticisms of John McDowell. Wilson claims that these criticisms rest on misunderstandings of Kripke and that, when correctly understood, Kripke's interpretation stands up to them well. In particular, Wilson defends Kripke's Wittgenstein against the charge of "non-factualism" about meaning. However, Wilson has not appreciated the full significance of McDowell's criticism. I use a brief exploration of Kripke's analogy between Wittgenstein and Hume to put this significance in sharp relief. It emerges that McDowell's response to Kripke's Wittgenstein account of meaning is in important respects analogous to Kant's response to Hume's account of causality, particularly Kant's complaint that Hume reduced the objective necessity of the causal nexus to a merely subjective necessity. In the same way Kripke's Wittgenstein reduces the objective normative force of meanings to a "quasi-subjective," community-relative status.
Machine generated contents note: Introduction Alan Berger; Part I. Naming, Necessity, Identity, and A Priority: 1. Kripke on proper and general names Bernard Linsky; 2. Kripke on vacuous names and names in fiction Nathan Salmon; 3. Kripke on epistemic and modal possibility: two routes to the necessary a posteriori Scott Soames; 4. Possible world semantics and its philosophic foundations Robert Stalnaker; Part II. Formal Semantics, Truth, Philosophy of Math, and Philosophy of Logic: 5. Kripke models for modal logic and intuitionism John Burgess; 6. Kripke's theory of truth John Burgess; 7. Kripke on logicism, Wittgenstein, and de re beliefs about numbers Mark Steiner; 8. Kripke on the incoherency of adopting a logic Alan Berger; Part III. Language and Mind: 9. Kripke's new puzzle about belief and our principles of belief attribution Mark Richard; 10.; A note on Kripke's puzzle about belief Nathan Salmon; 11. Kripke's version of Wittgenstein: some conceptions and misconceptions George Wilson; 12. Kripke on color words and the primary, secondary quality distinction Mario Gomez-Torrente; Part IV. Philosophy of Mind and Philosophical Psychology: 13. Kripke's views on carteisianism and naturalism Sydney Shoemaker; 14. Kripke's critique of functionalism Jeff Buechner.
Kripke and Dummett disagree over whether or not there could have been unicorns. Kripke thinks that there could not have been; Dummett thinks otherwise. I argue that Kripke is correct: there are no counterfactual situations properly describable as ones in which there would have been unicorns. In attempting to establish this claim, I argue that Dummett's critique of an argument (reminiscent of an argument of Kripke's) to the conclusion that there could not have been unicorns, is vitiated by a conflation of two superficially similar, though importantly different, claims. I then attempt to provide an account of the counter-intuitiveness of Kripke's position, arguing that the claim that there could not have been unicorns is best understood as a semantic, rather than metaphysical, claim. Finally, I provide a brief argument on behalf of the semantics of species terms that appears to underpin Kripke's position.
Some properties of Kripke-sheaf semantics for super-intuitionistic predicate logics are shown. The concept ofp-morphisms between Kripke sheaves is introduced. It is shown that if there exists ap-morphism from a Kripke sheaf 1 into 2 then the logic characterized by 1 is contained in the logic characterized by 2. Examples of Kripke-sheaf complete and finitely axiomatizable super-intuitionistic (and intermediate) predicate logics each of which is Kripke-frame incomplete are given. A correction to the author's previous paper Kripke bundles for intermediate predicate logics and Kripke frames for intuitionistic modal logics (Studia Logica, 49(1990), pp. 289–306 ) is stated.
The Kripke-completeness and incompleteness of some intermediate predicate logics is established. In particular, we obtain a Kripke-incomplete logic (H* +A+D+K) where H* is the intuitionistic predicate calculus, A is a disjunction-free propositional formula, D = x(P(x) V Q) xP(x) V Q, K = ¬¬x(P(x) V ¬P(x)) (the negative answer to a question of T. Shimura).
This chapter introduces Kripke's work to advanced undergraduates, mainly focussing on his "A Puzzle About Belief" and "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language".
It may be that all that matters for the modalities, possibility and necessity, is the object named by the proper name, not which proper name names it. An influential defender of this view is Saul Kripke. Kripke’s defense is criticized in the paper.
Kripke bundle [3] and C-set semantics [1] [2] are known as semantics which generalize standard Kripke semantics. In [3] and in [1], [2] it is shown that Kripke bundle and C-set semantics are stronger than standard Kripke semantics. Also it is true that C-set semantics for superintuitionistic logics is stronger than Kripke bundle semantics [5].In this paper, we show that Q-S4.1 is not Kripke bundle complete via C-set models. As a corollary we can give a simple proof showing that C-set semantics for modal logics are stronger than Kripke bundle semantics.
We propose a new, rather simple and short proof of Kripke-completeness for the predicate variant of Dummett's logic. Also a family of Kripke-incomplete extensions of this logic that are complete w.r.t. Kripke frames with equality (or equivalently, w.r.t. Kripke sheaves [8]), is described.
Discussion of Alexander Bird, Kripke
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