Kantian Reasons for Reasons

Ratio 20 (3):264–277 (2007)
Rüdiger Bittner has recently argued against a Kantian ‘maxims account’ of reasons for action. In this paper I argue – against Bittner – that Kantian maxims are not to be understood as reasons for action, but rather as reasons for reasons. On the interpretation presented here, Kantian maxims are the reasons for an agent’s being motivated by whatever more immediate reasons actually motivate her. This understanding of Kantian maxims suggests a recognizably realist Kantian position in ethics.
Keywords Kant  maxim  moral reasons  moral realism  Rüdiger Bittner
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2007.00364.x
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PhilPapers Archive Noell Birondo, Kantian Reasons for Reasons
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