David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ratio 20 (3):264–277 (2007)
Rüdiger Bittner has recently argued against a Kantian ‘maxims account’ of reasons for action. In this paper I argue – against Bittner – that Kantian maxims are not to be understood as reasons for action, but rather as reasons for reasons. On the interpretation presented here, Kantian maxims are the reasons for an agent’s being motivated by whatever more immediate reasons actually motivate her. This understanding of Kantian maxims suggests a recognizably realist Kantian position in ethics.
|Keywords||Rudiger Bittner maxim moral reasons moral realism|
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