David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ratio 18 (4):437–461 (2005)
Those who favour an ontology based on dispositions are thereby able to provide a dispositional essentialist account of the laws of nature. In part 1 of this paper I sketch the dispositional essentialist conception of properties and the concomitant account of laws. In part 2, I characterise various claims about the modal character of properties that fall under the heading ‘quidditism’ and which are consequences of the categoricalist view of properties, which is the alternative to the dispositional essentialist view. I argue that quidditism should be rejected. In part 3, I address a criticism of a strong dispositional essentialist view, viz. that ‘structural’ (i.e. geometrical, numerical, spatial and temporal) properties must be regarded as categorical.
|Keywords||laws, properties, dispositions, essences|
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Citations of this work BETA
John Roberts (2010). Some Laws of Nature Are Metaphysically Contingent. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):445-457.
Harold W. Noonan (2010). Bird Against the Humeans. Ratio 23 (1):73-86.
Sungho Choi (2009). The Conditional Analysis of Dispositions and the Intrinsic Dispositions Thesis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):568-590.
Michael Esfeld (2007). Mental Causation and the Metaphysics of Causation. Erkenntnis 67 (2):207 - 220.
Alexander Bird (2007). The Regress of Pure Powers? Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):513–534.
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