David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 38 (4):715-731 (2010)
I defend a pragmatist reinterpretation of Sellars’s famous manifest-scientific distinction. I claim that in order to do justice to this important distinction we must first recognize, despite what philosophers—including, arguably, Sellars—often make of it, that the distinction does not draw an epistemological or metaphysical boundary between different kinds of objects and events, but a pragmatic boundary between different ways in which we interact with objects and events. Put differently, I argue that the manifest-scientific distinction, in my view, can be best understood, not as a metaphysical distinction between apparent and real objects and events, or an epistemological distinction between perceptible and imperceptible objects and events, but rather as a distinction, which is not necessarily rigid over time, between distinct ways in which we collectively deal, in practice, with objects and events.
|Keywords||Pragmatism Eliminativism Manifest image Scientific image Perceptibles Imperceptibles|
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References found in this work BETA
David Z. Albert (2000). Time and Chance. Harvard University Press.
David Albert & Barry Loewer (1988). Interpreting the Many-Worlds Interpretation. Synthese 77 (November):195-213.
Bruce Aune (1990). Sellars's Two Images of the World. Journal of Philosophy 87 (10):537-545.
Robert Brandom (2002). Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality. Harvard University Press.
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