Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):279-281 (2008)
|Abstract||I defend my view that scientific progress is constituted by the accumulation of knowledge against a challenge from Rowbottom in favour of the semantic view that it is only truth that is relevant to progress.|
|Keywords||Scientific progress Knowledge Aim of inquiry Darrell Rowbottom|
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