The dispositionalist conception of laws

Foundations of Science 10 (4):353-70 (2005)
This paper sketches a dispositionalist conception of laws and shows how the dispositionalist should respond to certain objections. The view that properties are essentially dispositional is able to provide an account of laws that avoids the problems that face the two views of laws (the regularity and the contingent nomic necessitation views) that regard properties as categorical and laws as contingent. I discuss and reject the objections that (i) this view makes laws necessary whereas they are contingent; (ii) this view cannot account for certain kinds of laws of nature and their properties.
Keywords dispositions  dispositionalism  laws of nature  natural necessity  properties
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DOI 10.1007/s10699-004-5259-9
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References found in this work BETA
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.

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Citations of this work BETA
Alexander Bird (2007). The Regress of Pure Powers? Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):513–534.

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