Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 138 (1):73–89 (2008)
|Abstract||I argue for the claim that if Lewis’s regularity theory of laws were true, we could not know any positive law statement to be true. Premise 1: According to that theory, for any law statement true of the actual world, there is always a nearby world where the law statement is false (a world that differs with respect to one matter of particular fact). Premise 2: One cannot know a proposition to be true if it is false in a nearby world (the epistemological safety principle). The conclusion that no law statement can be known to be true follows immediately from the two premises.|
|Keywords||Laws Lewis Best-system analysis Principle of safety|
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