The Negative View of Natural Selection
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (2):569-573 (2012)
| Abstract | An influential argument due to Elliott Sober, subsequently strengthened by Denis Walsh and Joel Pust, moves from plausible premises to the bold conclusion that natural selection cannot explain the traits of individual organisms. If the argument were sound, the explanatory scope of selection would depend, surprisingly, on metaphysical considerations concerning origin essentialism. I show that the Sober-Walsh-Pust argument rests on a flawed counterfactual criterion for explanatory relevance. I further show that a more defensible criterion for explanatory relevance recently proposed by Michael Strevens lends support to the view that natural selection can be relevant to the explanation of individual traits. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Evolution Natural Selection Adaptation Causal explanation Contrastive explanation | |||||||||
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