The regress of pure powers?

Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):513–534 (2007)
Abstract
Dispositional monism is the view that natural properties and relations are ‘pure powers’. It is objected that dispositional monism involves some kind of vicious or otherwise unpalatable regress or circularity. I examine ways of making this objection precise. The most pressing interpretation is that is fails to make the identities of powers determinate. I demonstrate that this objection is in error. It does however puts certain constraints on what the structure of fundamental properties is like. I show what a satisfactory structure would be.
Keywords powers dispositions regress identity
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Black (2000). Against Quidditism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):87 – 104.
Brian Ellis & Caroline Lierse (1994). Dispositional Essentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):27 – 45.

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