David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 122 (1-2):179 - 208 (2000)
Epistemic responsibility involves at least two central ideas. (V) To be epistemically responsible is to display the virtue(s) epistemic internalists take to be central to justification (e.g., coherence, having good reasons, fitting the evidence). (C) In normal (non-skeptical)circumstances and in thelong run, epistemic responsibility is strongly positively correlated with reliability. Sections 1 and 2 review evidence showing that for a wide range of real-world problems, the most reliable, tractable reasoning strategies audaciously flout the internalist''s epistemic virtues. In Section 3, I argue that these results force us to give up either (V), our current conception of what it is to be epistemically responsible, or (C) the responsibility-reliability connection. I will argue that we should relinquish (V). This is likely to reshape our epistemic practices. It will force us to alter our epistemic judgments about certain instances of reasoning, to endorse some counterintuitive epistemic prescriptions, and to rethink what it is for cognitive agents to be epistemically responsible.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
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Citations of this work BETA
Michael A. Bishop (2002). The Theory Theory Thrice Over: The Child as Scientist, Superscientist, or Social Institution? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33 (1):121-36.
Michael A. Bishop (2005). The Autonomy of Social Epistemology. Episteme 2 (1):65-78.
A. P. Schwab (2008). Epistemic Trust, Epistemic Responsibility, and Medical Practice. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 33 (4):302-320.
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