Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action

Cambridge University Press (1990)
Abstract
From a moral point of view we think of ourselves as capable of responsible actions. From a scientific point of view we think of ourselves as animals whose behavior, however highly evolved, conforms to natural scientific laws. Natural Agency argues that these different perspectives can be reconciled, despite the skepticism of many philosophers who have argued that "free will" is impossible under "scientific determinism." This skepticism is best overcome according to the author, by defending a causal theory of action, that is by establishing that actions are constituted by behavioral events with the appropriate kind of mental causal history. He sets out a rich and subtle argument for such a theory and defends it against its critics. Thus the book demonstrates the importance of philosophical work in action theory for the central metaphysical task of understanding our place in nature.
Keywords Act (Philosophy  Causation  Agent (Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book $24.06 used (82% off)   $44.35 new (15% off)   $45.45 direct from Amazon (13% off)    Amazon page
Call number B105.A35.B54 1989
ISBN(s) 9780521374309   0521063973   0521374308
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,351
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA
    Randolph Clarke (2010). Skilled Activity and the Causal Theory of Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):523-550.

    View all 31 citations

    Similar books and articles
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    77 ( #14,290 of 1,088,372 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    3 ( #30,800 of 1,088,372 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.