David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cambridge University Press (1990)
From a moral point of view we think of ourselves as capable of responsible actions. From a scientific point of view we think of ourselves as animals whose behavior, however highly evolved, conforms to natural scientific laws. Natural Agency argues that these different perspectives can be reconciled, despite the skepticism of many philosophers who have argued that "free will" is impossible under "scientific determinism." This skepticism is best overcome according to the author, by defending a causal theory of action, that is by establishing that actions are constituted by behavioral events with the appropriate kind of mental causal history. He sets out a rich and subtle argument for such a theory and defends it against its critics. Thus the book demonstrates the importance of philosophical work in action theory for the central metaphysical task of understanding our place in nature.
|Keywords||Act (Philosophy Causation Agent (Philosophy|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$32.39 used (77% off) $47.76 new (14% off) $54.99 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||B105.A35.B54 1989|
|ISBN(s)||9780521374309 0521063973 0521374308|
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Citations of this work BETA
Wayne Wu (2015). Experts and Deviants: The Story of Agentive Control. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):n/a-n/a.
Joshua Shepherd (2014). The Contours of Control. Philosophical Studies 170 (3):395-411.
Christopher Evan Franklin (2011). Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument. Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.
Markus E. Schlosser (2012). Taking Something as a Reason for Action. Philosophical Papers 41 (2):267-304.
Yair Levy (2013). Intentional Action First. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.
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