Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action

Cambridge University Press (1990)
Abstract
From a moral point of view we think of ourselves as capable of responsible actions. From a scientific point of view we think of ourselves as animals whose behavior, however highly evolved, conforms to natural scientific laws. Natural Agency argues that these different perspectives can be reconciled, despite the skepticism of many philosophers who have argued that "free will" is impossible under "scientific determinism." This skepticism is best overcome according to the author, by defending a causal theory of action, that is by establishing that actions are constituted by behavioral events with the appropriate kind of mental causal history. He sets out a rich and subtle argument for such a theory and defends it against its critics. Thus the book demonstrates the importance of philosophical work in action theory for the central metaphysical task of understanding our place in nature.
Keywords Act (Philosophy  Causation  Agent (Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book $12.40 used (91% off)   $42.29 new (19% off)   $46.29 direct from Amazon (11% off)    Amazon page
Call number B105.A35.B54 1989
ISBN(s) 9780521374309   0521063973   0521374308
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,074
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Randolph Clarke (2010). Skilled Activity and the Causal Theory of Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):523-550.

View all 31 citations

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

86 ( #14,574 of 1,101,565 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #23,394 of 1,101,565 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.