The hidden premise in the causal argument for physicalism

Analysis 66 (289):44-52 (2006)
Abstract
The causal argument for physicalism is anayzed and it's key premise--the causal closure of physics--is found wanting. Therefore, a hidden premise must be added to the argument to gain its conclusion, but the hidden premise is indistinguishable from the conclusion of the causal argument. Therefore, it begs the question on physicalism.
Keywords Causation  Context  Law  Metaphysics  Overdetermination  Physicalism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8284.2006.00588.x
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References found in this work BETA
Paul Teller (2004). The Law‐Idealization. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):730-741.

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Citations of this work BETA
Robert C. Bishop (2010). Whence Chemistry? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 41 (2):171-177.

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