Why thought experiments are not arguments

Philosophy of Science 66 (4):534-541 (1999)
Abstract
Are thought experiments nothing but arguments? I argue that it is not possible to make sense of the historical trajectory of certain thought experiments if one takes them to be arguments. Einstein and Bohr disagreed about the outcome of the clock-in-the-box thought experiment, and so they reconstructed it using different arguments. This is to be expected whenever scientists disagree about a thought experiment's outcome. Since any such episode consists of two arguments but just one thought experiment, the thought experiment cannot be the arguments
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Citations of this work BETA
Claus Beisbart (2012). How Can Computer Simulations Produce New Knowledge? European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (3):395-434.
Walter Hopp (2014). Experiments in Thought. Perspectives on Science 22 (2):242-263.
Paul Thagard (2013). Thought Experiments Considered Harmful. Perspectives on Science 22 (2):122-139.
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