David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 185 (2):233-255 (2012)
Emergence is interpreted in a non-dualist framework of thought. No metaphysical distinction between the higher and basic levels of organization is supposed, but only a duality of modes of access. Moreover, these modes of access are not construed as mere ways of revealing intrinsic patterns of organization: They are supposed to be constitutive of them, in Kant’s sense. The emergent levels of organization, and the inter-level causations as well, are therefore neither illusory nor ontologically real: They are objective in the sense of transcendental epistemology. This neo-Kantian approach defuses several paradoxes associated with the concept of downward causation, and enables one to make good sense of it independently of any prejudice about the existence (or inexistence) of a hierarchy of levels of being
|Keywords||Emergence Inter-level relations Anti-foundationalism Transcendentalism Objectivity Anti-realism Quantum mechanics|
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Citations of this work BETA
Luisa Damiano (2012). Co-Emergences in Life and Science: A Double Proposal for Biological Emergentism. [REVIEW] Synthese 185 (2):273-294.
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