Ontology, matter and emergence

“Ontological emergence” of inherent high-level properties with causal powers is witnessed nowhere. A non-substantialist conception of emergence works much better. It allows downward causation, provided our concept of causality is transformed accordingly.
Keywords Philosophy   Artificial Intelligence   Philosophy of Mind   Interdisciplinary Studies   Phenomenology
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11097-006-9041-z
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Paul W. Humphreys (1997). How Properties Emerge. Philosophy of Science 64 (1):1-17.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

118 ( #24,688 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #71,121 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.