Can Theories of Meaning and Reference Solve the Problem of Legal Determinacy?

Ratio Juris 16 (3):281-295 (2003)
A number of important legal theorists have recently argued for metaphysically realist approaches to legal determinacy grounded in particular semantic theories or theories of reference, in particular, views of meaning and reference based on the works of Putnam and Kripke. The basic position of these theorists is that questions of legal interpretation and legal determinacy should be approached through semantic meaning. However, the role of authority (in the form of lawmaker choice) in law in general, and democratic systems in particular, require that these realist solutions to the problem of legal determinacy be rejected, or at least significantly revised.
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9337.00237
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R. M. Dworkin (1988). Law's Empire. Harvard University Press.
Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.

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