The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility

Noûs 46 (2):326-354 (2012)
In this paper, we do three things. First, we put forth a novel hypothesis about judgments of moral responsibility according to which such judgments are a species of explanatory judgments. Second, we argue that this hypothesis explains both some general features of everyday thinking about responsibility and the appeal of skeptical arguments against moral responsibility. Finally, we argue that, if correct, the hypothesis provides a defense against these skeptical arguments.
Keywords Moral responsibility  Moral psychology  Ethics  Free will  Determinism  Luck
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00813.x
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PhilPapers Archive Gunnar Björnsson, The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility
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Gunnar Björnsson (2014). Essentially Shared Obligations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):103-120.

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