The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility

Noûs 46 (2):326-354 (2012)
Abstract
In this paper, we do three things. First, we put forth a novel hypothesis about judgments of moral responsibility according to which such judgments are a species of explanatory judgments. Second, we argue that this hypothesis explains both some general features of everyday thinking about responsibility and the appeal of skeptical arguments against moral responsibility. Finally, we argue that, if correct, the hypothesis provides a defense against these skeptical arguments.
Keywords Moral responsibility  Moral psychology  Ethics  Free will  Determinism  Luck
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    References found in this work BETA
    Richard Boyd (1988). How to Be a Moral Realist. In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. 181-228.

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