A warranted-assertability defense of a Moorean response to skepticism

Acta Analytica 23 (3):187-205 (2008)
According to a Moorean response to skepticism, the standards for knowledge are invariantly comparatively low, and we can know across contexts all that we ordinarily take ourselves to know. It is incumbent upon the Moorean to defend his position by explaining how, in contexts in which S seems to lack knowledge, S can nevertheless have knowledge. The explanation proposed here relies on a warranted-assertability maneuver: Because we are warranted in asserting that S doesn’t know that p, it can seem that S does in fact lack that piece of knowledge. Moreover, this warranted-assertability maneuver is unique and better than similar maneuvers because it makes use of H. P. Grice’s general conversational rule of Quantity—“Do not make your contribution more informative than is required”—in explaining why we are warranted in asserting that S doesn’t know that p.
Keywords Warranted-assertability  Mooreanism   Skepticism  Knowledge
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s12136-008-0034-0
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,879
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.

View all 33 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Duncan Pritchard (2002). Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3):283 – 307.
Peter Baumann (2011). WAMs: Why Worry? Philosophical Papers 40 (2):155 - 177.
Jim Stone (2007). Contextualism and Warranted Assertion. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):92–113.
Tim Black (2008). Defending a Sensitive Neo-Moorean Invariantism. In Vincent Hendricks & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan 8--27.
Martijn Blaauw (2003). WAMming Away at Contextualism. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):88-97.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

48 ( #69,901 of 1,725,168 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

10 ( #64,836 of 1,725,168 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.