Online research in philosophy

This paper examines Aquinas’s epistemological treatment of the disembodied soul in order to reveal (1) its relationship to the person it once was, and (2) the nature and extent of its self-knowledge. I argue first that disembodiment entails not only loss of personhood, but severe restriction of one’s concept of self. Consequently, individual self-consciousness is minimized. By contrast, I argue that the soul’s knowledge of its nature is likely to be realized more perfectly in the separated state, not so much because of freedom from the body as the infusion of pure intelligibles. Thus, the roles of these two types of self-knowledge (particular and universal) are reversed from the case of the embodied soul, where self-consciousness is an effortless concomitant to thought and self-knowledge requires a painstaking labor. I conclude by wondering whether the cognition enjoyed in the separated state has some utility for the soul’s future, re-embodied existence.

Journeys of Ghazali and Averroes to their diverse conceptions of the role of reason -- From the chimera of philosophy to the evidence of "the just balance" -- The decisive criterion of the distinction between islam and hypocrisy (zandaqa) -- Averroes, philospher-reader of the precious book -- Reorganization of the world according to Aristotle in the light of Qurʼanic revelation by Averroes -- Ghazali and Averroes in Muslim society.

Essays discuss the evolution of consciousness, self-knowledge, aesthetics, religious ecstasy, ghosts, and dreams.

Averroës, the greatest Aristotelian of the Islamic philosophical tradition, composed some thirty-eight commentaries on the "First Teacher's" corpus, including three separate treatments of De Anima ("On the Soul"): the works commonly referred to as the Short, Middle, and Long Commentaries. The Middle Commentary--actually Averroës's last writing on the text-remains one of his most refined and politically discreet treatments of Aristotle, offering modern readers Averroës's final statement on the material intellect and conjunction as well as an accessible historical window on Aristotle's work as it was interpreted and transmitted in the medieval period.

The phenomenology of cognition according to Thomas Aquinas -- Experiential, conceptual and intuitive moments in the knowledge of faith -- Philosophia and sacra doctrina.

Giles of Rome, in his early treatise, De plurificatione possibilis intellectus, criticizes the arguments of Thomas Aquinas against the Averroist doctrine of the uniqueness of the possible intellect on the grounds that Aquinas does not fully appreciate the distinction between material and intentional forms and the differences in how these forms are generated. Nevertheless, like Aquinas, he argues that Averroes' doctrine still results in the apparently absurd consequence that homo non intelligit, i.e., the individual, particular man, this man, does not understand. Giles, however, attempts to respond to certain "radical" Averroists, who, in a bold and clever maneuver, affirm that homo non intelligit. While Giles does effectively argue that homo non intelligit is not the opinion of Averroes, he is unable to demonstrate the absurdity of homo non intelligit in a manner that would be convincing to the Averroists. This is because Giles, like Aquinas, maintains that the intellect is a power of the soul, and thus has a different conception of the relation between body and intellect than do the Averroists, who emphasize the separateness of the intellect.

The proofs for God's existence advanced in the most prominent theological work of Averroes (d. 1198), the Kita^b al-kashf, have been neglected, largely because the book has commonly – and correctly – been viewed as being meant for popular consumption. This article argues that although Averroes' arguments are non-technical, the Commentator nevertheless takes pains not to speak against his philosophical beliefs. Averroes distinguishes between inductive and deductive arguments, with conventional arguments from design falling into the former camp. Averroes also assigns a place for teleological argumentation when assigning a special role for the prime mover within the hierarchy of unmoved movers.