Classic invariantism, relevance and warranted assertability manœvres

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):328–336 (2005)
Jessica Brown effectively contends that Keith DeRose’s latest argument for contextualism fails to rule out contextualism’s chief rival, namely, classic invariantism. Still, even if her position has not been ruled out, the classic invariantist must offer considerations in favor of her position if she is to convince us that it is superior to contextualism. Brown defends classic invariantism with a warranted assertability maneuver that utilizes a linguistic pragmatic principle of relevance. I argue, however, that this maneuver is not as effective as it might be. I propose a different warranted assertability maneuver—one that utilizes a pragmatic principle of strength—that affords a more successful defense of classic invariantism, and that helps to establish that classic invariantism is superior to contextualism.
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DOI 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00402.x
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References found in this work BETA
Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Keith DeRose (1992). Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
Jessica Brown (2005). Adapt or Die: The Death of Invariantism? Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):263–285.

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Peter Baumann (2011). WAMs: Why Worry? Philosophical Papers 40 (2):155 - 177.

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