Classic invariantism, relevance and warranted assertability manœvres

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):328–336 (2005)
Abstract
Jessica Brown effectively contends that Keith DeRose’s latest argument for contextualism fails to rule out contextualism’s chief rival, namely, classic invariantism. Still, even if her position has not been ruled out, the classic invariantist must offer considerations in favor of her position if she is to convince us that it is superior to contextualism. Brown defends classic invariantism with a warranted assertability maneuver that utilizes a linguistic pragmatic principle of relevance. I argue, however, that this maneuver is not as effective as it might be. I propose a different warranted assertability maneuver—one that utilizes a pragmatic principle of strength—that affords a more successful defense of classic invariantism, and that helps to establish that classic invariantism is superior to contextualism.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,819
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Thomas A. Blackson (2004). An Invalid Argument for Contextualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):344–345.
Jessica Brown (2005). Adapt or Die: The Death of Invariantism? Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):263–285.
Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Keith DeRose (1992). Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.

View all 7 references

Citations of this work BETA
Avner Baz (2009). Who Knows? European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):201-223.
Peter Baumann (2011). WAMs: Why Worry? Philosophical Papers 40 (2):155 - 177.
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

35 ( #52,451 of 1,099,914 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #51,477 of 1,099,914 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.