Humanity's natural face
Philosophical Explorations 3 (3):282 – 296 (2000)
| Abstract | In my article I summarize a 'Humean' view of deliberation, and in particular deliberation with an ethical aspect. I regard Hume as having paved the way for a 'naturalistic' account of these things, avoiding Kantian fantasies of agency that dominate much current work. Contrary to what is often supposed, the Humean story gives a satisfactory account of dutiful or principled motivations, and a rich account of the ways in which different aspects of character are selected as 'useful or agreeable to ourselves or others'. | |||||||||
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Jeremy Stangroom (2000). New Media, New Puzzles. The Philosopher's Magazine (9):53-53.
Jeremy Stangroom (2000). New Media, New Puzzles. The Philosopher's Magazine (9):53-53.
Jeremy Stangroom (2000). New Media, New Puzzles. The Philosopher's Magazine (9):53-53.
Jeremy Stangroom (2000). New Media, New Puzzles. The Philosopher's Magazine (9):53-53.
Jeremy Stangroom (2000). New Media, New Puzzles. The Philosopher's Magazine (9):53-53.
Jeremy Stangroom (2000). New Media, New Puzzles. The Philosopher's Magazine (9):53-53.
Jeremy Stangroom (2000). New Media, New Puzzles. The Philosopher's Magazine (9):53-53.
Simon Lumsden (2000). Absolute Difference and Social Ontology: Levinas Face to Face with Buber and Fichte. Human Studies 23 (3):227-241.
Spencer J. Pack & Eric Schliesser (2006). Smith's Humean Criticism of Hume's Account of the Origin of Justice. Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (1):47-63.
Helen Beebee & Alfred R. Mele (2002). Humean Compatibilism. Mind 111 (442):201-223.
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