David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):303--344 (2009)
This paper examines, from the point of view of a philosopher of science, what it is that introductory science textbooks say and do not say about 'scientific method'. Seventy introductory texts in a variety of natural and social sciences provided the material for this study. The inadequacy of these textbook accounts is apparent in three general areas: (a) the simple empiricist view of science that tends to predominate; (b) the demarcation between scientific and non-scientific inquiry and (c) the avoidance of controversy-in part the consequence of the tendency toward textbook standardization. Most importantly, this study provides some evidence of the gulf that separates philosophy of science from science instruction, and examines some important aspects of the demarcation between science and non-science-an important issue for philosophers, scientists, and science educators
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References found in this work BETA
James Blachowicz (1995). Elimination, Correction and Popper's Evolutionary Epistemology. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (1):5 – 17.
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Citations of this work BETA
Till Grüne-Yanoff (2014). Teaching Philosophy of Science to Scientists: Why, What and How. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (1):115-134.
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