Is objective moral justification possible on a quasi-realist foundation?

Inquiry 42 (2):213 – 227 (1999)
This essay juxtaposes the position in metaethics defended, expressivism with quasirealistic trimmings, with the ancient problem of relativism. It argues that, perhaps surprisingly, there is less of a problem of normative truth on this approach than on others. Because ethics is not in the business of representing aspects of the world, there is no way to argue for a plurality of moral truths, simply from the existence of a plurality of moral opinions. The essay also argues that other approaches, which superficially seem better adapted to defending robust and substantive conceptions of moral truth, in fact face more danger from the threat of relativism. This is particularly so in the case of 'secondary quality' or 'response-dependent' approaches, but also in the case of certain kinds of constructivism.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/002017499321552
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,280
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Jeremy Fantl (2006). Is Metaethics Morally Neutral? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):24–44.
J. S. Biehl (2005). Ethical Instrumentalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):353 - 369.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

220 ( #14,867 of 1,932,462 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

16 ( #46,246 of 1,932,462 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.