Meta‐Ethical Realism with Good of a Kind

European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):n/a-n/a (2012)
Abstract
There is a difference between an object's being good simpliciter and an object's being good of its kind, and the vast majority of philosophers have supposed that it is the former variety of goodness that is relevant to ethics. I argue that one may be a meta-ethical realist while employing the notion of good of a kind to the exclusion of good simpliciter; I call such a view kindism. I distinguish between two varieties of kindism, explicate the details of one of those varieties, and defend (that variety of) kindism against possible objections
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,007
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
P. T. Geach (1956). Good and Evil. Analysis 17 (2):33 - 42.

View all 16 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Abraham Rudnick (2001). A Meta-Ethical Critique of Care Ethics. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 22 (6):505-517.
Garrett Cullity (1999). Virtue Ethics, Theory, and Warrant. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):277-294.
Julian Fink (2007). Is the Right Prior to the Good? South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):143-149.
Joseph Millum (2008). A Biological Alternative to Moral Explanations. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):385-407.
Heather Logue (2013). Good News for the Disjunctivist About (One of) the Bad Cases. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):105-133.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-05-05

Total downloads

11 ( #136,539 of 1,101,180 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #81,288 of 1,101,180 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.