Abstract

Sensibility theory is a metaethical view whose constituent philosophical positions include moral cognitivism, moral internalism, and the Humean theory of action. Each of these theses possesses a high degree of plausibility when considered individually, but the triad is often thought to be jointly inconsistent. If motivation requires a desire, and if moral judgment expresses only belief, then motivation cannot be internal to that judgment. Alternatively, and again assuming motivation requires a desire, if motivation is internal to the acceptance of a moral judgment, then that judgment cannot express belief only. In this dissertation I explicate and develop sensibility theory's implications for these three theses in light of the theory's implicit claim that they can be held consistently. I suggest that two modifications are required. First, regarding cognitivism, moral judgment needs to be seen as essentially expressing both belief and desire . The second modification concerns Hume. Hume's theory requires both a belief and desire to explain an intentional action, with the springs of motivation residing with desire. But Hume's view also says that these states are absolutely distinct--belief functions to fit the world, and desire functions to change the world. The suggested modification is that some desires must be seen as "fitting" the world in their own way--in the sense of being appropriate, or being sensitive to the real nature of a situation. With these two changes in place, we can see moral judgment in the following way: as expressing a unitary thought, consisting of two essential aspects--a belief aspect and a desire aspect. Internalism can now be accounted for, since desire is internal to what is expressed in a moral judgment. And since some desires are "fitting", the judgment as a whole may or may not get things right. In the remainder of the dissertation I discuss and argue for the plausibility of these modifications, especially in light of the analogy between moral properties and secondary qualities which suggests that the adequate understanding and recognition of both moral properties and secondary qualities is essentially connected to human subjective sensibilities--affective sensibilities in the former case, and visual sensibilities in the latter case. I also explore how this view allows morality to be seen as "objective"