No Impediment to Solidity as Impediment

Metaphysica 7 (1):35-41 (2006)
ABSTRACT: Quassim Cassam (1997) accepts the standard account of solidity, according to which, if S feels x as solid, then S feels x as an imediment to his movement. Recently, Martin Fricke and Paul Snowdon (2003) have presented a battery of counter-examples designed to show that S may feel x as solid and as exerting a pressure that supports or facilitates his movement. In this note, I defend the standard account against Fricke and Snowdon’s attack. Integral to this defense is a distinction between two (sometimes overlapping) ways in which S may feel x as an impediment to his movement: as an influence on a movement state of S, or as an obstacle to the achievement of a goal that requires movement. After demonstrating the primacy of the former sense, I argue that Fricke and Snowdon’s counter-examples only undermine a version of the standard account that glosses ‘impediment’ as an obstacle to the achievement of a goal that requires movement.
Keywords solidity  perception
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,904
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
David Morris (2002). Touching Intelligence. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 29 (149-162):149-162.
David Sanford (1967). Volume and Solidity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):329 – 340.
K. E. Baier (1948). Objectivity in Ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):147 – 165.
Nancy Maull (1978). Perception and Primary Qualities. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978:3 - 17.
Ernest W. Adams (1988). A Note on Solidity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (4):512 – 516.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

23 ( #126,522 of 1,725,558 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

13 ( #53,223 of 1,725,558 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.