Ruling Passions

Oxford University Press (1998)
Abstract
Simon Blackburn puts forward a compelling original philosophy of human motivation and morality. Why do we behave as we do? Can we improve? Is our ethics at war with our passions, or is it an upshot of those passions? Blackburn seeks the answers to such questions in an exploration of the nature of moral emotions and the structures of human motivation. His theory is naturalistic: it integrates our understanding of ethics with the rest of our understanding of the world we live in. But he does not debunk the ethical by reducing it to the non-ethical, and he banishes the spectres of scepticism and relativism that have haunted recent moral philosophy. Ruling Passions reveals how ethics can maintain its authority even though it is rooted in the very emotions and motivations that it exists to control.
Keywords metaethics   expressivism   noncognitivism   nonfactualism
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Reprint years 2000
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Call number BJ1311.B53 2000
ISBN(s) 0198247850     9780198247852
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00191.x
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Antti Kauppinen (2007). The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):95 – 118.
Daniel Greco (2014). A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.

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