Solving the problem of easy knowledge

Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):597-617 (2008)
Stewart Cohen argues that several epistemological theories fall victim to the problem of easy knowledge: they allow us to know far too easily that certain sceptical hypotheses are false and that how things seem is a reliable indicator of how they are. This problem is a result of the theories' interaction with an epistemic closure principle. Cohen suggests that the theories should be modified. I argue that attempts to solve the problem should focus on closure instead; a new and plausible epistemic closure principle can solve the problem of easy knowledge. My solution offers a uniform and more successful response to different versions of the problem of easy knowledge
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.554.x
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References found in this work BETA
Stewart Cohen (2002). Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.
James Pryor (2004). What's Wrong with Moore's Argument? Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Stewart Cohen (1988). How to Be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.
James Pryor (2004). What's Wrong with Moore's Argument? Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349-378.

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