Truth and A Priori Possibility: Egan's Charge Against Quasi-Realism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):201-213 (2009)
In this journal Andy Egan argued that, contrary to what I have claimed, quasi-realism is committed to a damaging asymmetry between the way a subject regards himself and the way he regards others. In particular, a subject must believe it to be a priori that if something is one of his stable or fundamental beliefs, then it is true. Whereas he will not hold that this is a priori true of other people. In this paper I rebut Egan's argument, and give further consideration to the correct way to think about our own fallibility
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802362182
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Jamin Asay (2012). A Truthmaking Account of Realism and Anti-Realism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):373-394.
Teemu Toppinen (2015). Expressivism and the Normativity of Attitudes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):233-255.
Sebastian Köhler (2014). What is the Problem with Fundamental Moral Error? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):161-165.
Nicholas Smyth (2014). Resolute Expressivism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (4):1-12.

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