Truth and A Priori Possibility: Egan's Charge Against Quasi-Realism
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):201-213 (2009)
| Abstract | In this journal Andy Egan argued that, contrary to what I have claimed, quasi-realism is committed to a damaging asymmetry between the way a subject regards himself and the way he regards others. In particular, a subject must believe it to be a priori that if something is one of his stable or fundamental beliefs, then it is true. Whereas he will not hold that this is a priori true of other people. In this paper I rebut Egan's argument, and give further consideration to the correct way to think about our own fallibility | |||||||||
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