Unarticulated meaning

Erkenntnis 40 (1):43 - 70 (1994)
Abstract
It is a common experience of mental life that we come to articulate meanings which we had initially grasped in only a sketchy way. In this paper, I consider how this idea of an initially unarticulated meaning may fit in a general theory of mental representation. I propose to identify unarticulated meanings with what I callspecific concepts, which are quite similar to Rosch's categories of basic objects and are distinct both from images and generic concepts (which come to articulate meanings). I argue that unarticulated meaning is non-representational in an important respect, a claim which relies on a distinction amonglevels of representation.
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DOI 10.1007/BF01128715
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References found in this work BETA
Immanuel Kant (2007). Critique of Pure Reason. In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Blackwell Pub. Ltd. 449-451.
S. Ullman (1980). Against Direct Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):333-81.

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