David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Analytica 25 (4):393-411 (2010)
Our aim in this paper is to evaluate Frank Jackson and Philip Pettitâs âprogram explanationâ framework as an account of the autonomy of the special sciences. We argue that this framework can only explain the autonomy of a limited range of special science explanations. The reason for this limitation is that the framework overlooks a distinction between two kinds of properties, which we refer to as âhigher-levelâ and âhigher-orderâ properties. The program explanation framework can account for the autonomy of special science explanations that appeal to higher-level properties but it does not account for the autonomy of most of those explanations that appeal to higher-order properties
|Keywords||Explanation Reduction Causation Autonomy|
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