David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63 (2010)
Much of recent philosophy of perception is oriented towards accounting for the phenomenal character of perception—what it is like to perceive—in a non-mentalistic way—that is, without appealing to mental objects or mental qualities. In opposition to such views, I claim that the phenomenal character of perception of a red round object cannot be explained by or reduced to direct awareness of the object, its redness and roundness—or representation of such objects and qualities. Qualities of perception that are not captured by what one is directly aware of or by representational content are instances of what Gilbert Harman has called “mental paint” (Block, 1990; Harman, 1990). The claim of this paper is that empirical facts about attention point in the direction of mental paint. The argument starts with the claim (later modified) that when one moves one's attention around a scene while keeping one's eyes fixed, the phenomenology of perception can change in ways that do not reflect which qualities of objects one is directly aware of or the way the world is represented to be. These changes in the phenomenology of perception cannot be accounted for in terms of awareness of or representation of the focus of attention because they manifest themselves in experience as differences in apparent contrast, apparent color saturation, apparent size, apparent speed, apparent time of occurrence and other appearances. There is a way of coping with these phenomena in terms of vague contents, but vague contents cannot save direct realism or representationism because the kind of vagueness required clashes wth the phenomenology itself
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
Alva Noë (2005). Action in Perception. The MIT Press.
Tyler Burge (2010). Origins of Objectivity. OUP Oxford.
Fred Dretske (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Declan Smithies (2013). The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):744-754.
Berit Brogaard (2015). Type 2 Blindsight and the Nature of Visual Experience. Consciousness and Cognition 32:92-103.
Ophelia Deroy (2013). Object-Sensitivity Versus Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophical Studies 162 (1):87-107.
Berit Brogaard (2015). The Self-Locating Property Theory of Color. Minds and Machines 25 (2):133-147.
Philipp Koralus (2014). The Erotetic Theory of Attention: Questions, Focus and Distraction. Mind and Language 29 (1):26-50.
Similar books and articles
Alan Allport (1993). Attention and Control. Have We Been Asking the Wrong Questions? A Critical Review of Twenty-Five Years. In David E. Meyer & Sylvan Kornblum (eds.), Attention and Performance XIV. The MIT Press 183-218.
Vasudevi Reddy (2005). Before the `Third Element': Understanding Attention to Self. In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press 85--109.
Hisayasu Kobayashi (2010). Self-Awareness and Mental Perception. Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (3):233-245.
Antonino Raffone, Angela Tagini & Narayanan Srinivasan (2010). Mindfulness and the Cognitive Neuroscience of Attention and Awareness. Zygon 45 (3):627-646.
Michael Huemer, Sense-Data. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Jeff Speaks (2010). Attention and Intentionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):325-342.
Carolyn Suchy-Dicey (2012). Inductive Parsimony and the Methodological Argument. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):605-609.
Ned Block (1996). Mental Paint and Mental Latex. Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.
Added to index2010-08-08
Total downloads374 ( #5,187 of 1,911,814 )
Recent downloads (6 months)21 ( #31,563 of 1,911,814 )
How can I increase my downloads?