Author's response

Abstract
The distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness arises from the battle between biological and computational approaches to the mind. If P = A, the computationalists are right; but if not, the biological nature of P yields its scientific nature.
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Citations of this work BETA
Fred Dretske (2003). Experience as Representation. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):67-82.
Aaron Sloman (2010). An Alternative to Working on Machine Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (1):1-18.
Piotr Boltuc (2009). The Philosophical Issue in Machine Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):155-176.
Aaron Sloman (2010). Machine Consciousness: Response to Commentaries. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (1):75-116.

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Nicholas Shea (2012). Methodological Encounters with the Phenomenal Kind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):307-344.
Review author[S.]: Philip S. Kitcher (1995). Author's Response. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):653-673.

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